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DEMOCRACY IN THE WAR AGAINST
TERRORISM-THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE
Emanuel Gross*
I. INTRODUCTION
The signing of the Oslo Accords inspired the belief that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict would soon draw to a close. The passing
years, however, have not brought peace to the Middle East. The
armed conflict, which was due to end upon the signing of the
agreements, on occasion subsided and on occasion escalated, until
finally erupting in October 2000. In that month, the Palestinians
declared a popular uprising, similar to the Intifadah declared in
1987.2 In the beginning of October 2000, violent demonstrations
took place, which intensified as time went on.3 Shooting and
terrorist attacks were launched, the likes of which Israel had not seen
for many years. Now, not a day passes without shootings at Israeli
settlements adjacent to or located in Judah, Samaria and the Gaza
Strip. Terror attacks target every city and every place. No road is
safe or immune from terrorist activity, be it shootings at passing
vehicles, road side bombs or suicide bombers detonating themselves
in public buses. No hour is safe. Terrorism operates around the
* Professor of Law, Haifa University. Thanks are due to my research
assistant Ms. Dalit Ken-Dror, whose diligence and dedicated work enabled this
article. I would also like to thank the Netanya Academic College - School of
Law and Dean Sinay Deutch who assisted in financing this article.
** Please note that where necessary the author performed all translations
from Hebrew to English.
*** This article is taken in part from an article previously published by this
author in the UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs. It has
been updated to account for the events of September 11, 2001.
1. See Emanuel Gross, Tied to an Enemy, After All, WASH. POST, Dec. 9,
2001, atBI.
2. See Palestinian, Israeli Crisis Stirs Global Protests (Dec. 30, 2000), at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/12/30/mideast.02/index.html.
3. See id.
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clock, on every street comer. Even a quiet night's sleep
impossible to find in certain quarters of Jerusalem because Arz
gunmen often choose the early hours to fire upon adjacent Jewi,
neighborhoods. The feeling of life under the threat of terrorism ar
the sense of where terrorism may lead is eloquently described in tt
following passage:
Terrorism is the cancer of the modem world. No State is
immune to it. It is a dynamic organism which attacks the
healthy flesh of the surrounding society. It has the essential
hallmark of malignant cancer: unless treated, and treated
drastically, its growth is inexorable, until it poisons and
engulfs the society on which it feeds and drags it down to
destruction.
4
The attempts by Israel, the United States, and the Europea
Economic Market, to ask the Chairman of the Palestinian Authori]
Mr. Yasser Arafat, to declare an end to the conflict and call upon a
the terrorist organizations to cease their activities have all prove
fruitless. 5 Likewise, the repeated requests that those responsible fc
the terrorist activities be arrested, extradited and tried have been mc
with an adamant refusal. Recently, massive pressure has bee
exerted on the Palestinian Authority to arrest a list of know
terrorists. According to statements by Chairman Arafat, a larg
proportion of these people have indeed been arrested.6 The questio:
which arises is whether these people will be kept under arrest, c
whether immediately after their arrest they will be released, free t,
continue pursuing terrorism and destruction as they have in the pas
Lately, Palestinian terrorism has taken a new turn with attempts t
assassinate political figures. One of these attempts regrettabl
succeeded with the murder of Transport Minister Rehavam Ze'evi i
a Jerusalem hotel.7
4. Paul Johnson, The Cancer of Terrorism, in TERRORISM: HOW TH
WEST CAN WIN 31 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986).
5. See Sharon Sees Palestinian State at End of Peace Process (Feb.
2002), at http://www.cnn.com/20O2/us/02/07/us.meast/index.html.
6. See Palestinian Assassination Suspects Arrested (Feb. 21, 2002), c
http://cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/02/21/zeevi.arrests/index.html.
7. See Rechavan Zeevi: A Controversial Figure (Oct. 17, 2001), c
http://europe.cnn.com/2001...st/10/1 7/israel.zeevi.profile/index.html.
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The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,
2001, perpetrated by followers of Osama bin Laden, proved that
terrorism is not a regional problem but an international crime that
threatens the free world. The United States, the greatest democracy
in the world, has been forced to declare war against terrorism.8 Like
Israel, it seeks a legal solution in this struggle.
Against this background, Israel must defend itself against
terrorist attacks with all the legal measures at its disposal. This
Article will review the range of efforts and measures adopted by
Israel, while taking a glimpse at and drawing a comparison with
comparative law.
First, this Article will examine the nature of terrorism and
whether it may be defined in a simple and unequivocal manner.
Next, there will be an examination of possible ways to gather
information about terrorist activities. In this context, the Article will
consider which methods of interrogation are permitted when
investigating terrorists. In Section Four, the Article discusses the
legal status of terrorists upon capture-whether or not they must be
regarded as combatants and granted the rights of prisoners of war.
The Article then examines whether the method of targeted
elimination employed by Israel against terrorists is lawful, and
whether parallel methods are being used elsewhere in the world.
Finally, we shall proceed to examine a number of devices available
to a military commander to prevent the infiltration of terrorists into
Israel and to safeguard public order and safety.
8. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress
and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.htm.
President Bush's speech before Congress when he declared that America's
resolve was "freedom at war with fear." The President further stated that:
Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has
been found, stopped and defeated....
This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake
is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is
civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and
pluralism, tolerance and freedom.
June 2002] 1163
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II. WHAT IS TERRORISM?
The term "terrorism" cannot easily be defined in a clear and
unequivocal manner. This term was first invented and applied
during the French Revolution when the government established the
"Reign of Terror." The purpose was to execute political opponents,
seize their property, and instill dread in the hearts of the population
in order to coerce them to submit to the government.
9
Nonetheless, the majority of definitions have a common basis-
terrorism is the use of violence and the imposition of dread in order
to achieve a particular purpose. Generally, terrorism desires to bring
about the collapse of an existing regime, or revolt against it.10 It is
for this purpose that the members of the group organize themselves
within a structure that enables the leaders to closely supervise their
subordinates.1 Terrorism primarily draws its power from political
and religious sources. 2  In the past, terrorism was focused and
limited to specific localities. Today, however, the problem of
terrorism is worldwide. 13 Nowadays, the terrorist organizations also
organize swiftly, without registering any ordered activity
whatsoever. Further, a new medium has been opened for terrorist
activity-terrorism via the Internet. This activity is carried out, inter
alia, by bringing down websites or causing them to close down
temporarily, as well as by the infiltration of viruses into essential
computers. 14 This form of Internet terrorism must also be taken into
account when attempting to define the term.
A variety of statutory definitions have been given to the term
"terrorism." For example, Part 20 of the British Prevention of
Terrorism Act of 1989 (Temporary Provisions) states that:
9. See David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror:
Civil Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REv. 247, 251 (1996).
10. See David C. Marshall, Comment, Political Asylum: Time for a Change
- The Potential Effectiveness of Reforms to Prevent Terrorist Attacks in
America, 99 DICK. L. REV. 1017, 1018-19 (1995).
11. See id. at 1019.
12. See id. at 1031-32.
13. See id. at 1020-21.
14. See Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance
Between the Right of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of
Human Rights, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89, 97-98 (2001)
[hereinafter Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism].
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"terrorism means the use of violence for political ends and includes
any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any
section of the public in fear."'
' 5
Use of the term "violence" hints at unlawful behavior and, more
precisely, the commission of offenses which include a threat to the
safety of an individual. 16 The term "political ends" emphasizes the
fact that terrorism is symbolic of other underlying issues.'
7
However, there are a number of problems with this definition. For
example, the definition still embraces a number of offenses which,
according to one's ordinary feelings, should not be described as
terrorist acts. 18 Further, Schedule 1 of the British Prevention of
Terrorism Act of 1984 (Temporary Provisions) lists two
organizations as terrorist organizations: the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).19 In addition,
it provides that all those who belong to or support these
organizations are terrorists. 20  The Secretary of State may add
additional organizations to this list or remove organizations from the
list.
21
An additional definition of terrorism may be found in the Fourth
Geneva Convention, which provides that an act of violence against
the population, against civilians who are not combatants, for
political, ethnic, racial or religious reasons, will be regarded as a
terrorist act.22
The definition of terror as a violent act may be problematic.
Thus, an accidental killing or an act which the police or army take to
preserve public order, and which no one would deem to be an act of
terror, might fall within the definition of terror because it is an act of
violence. However, as already noted, these acts will not be defined
as acts of terror per se. Possibly, the distinction lies in the legal
15. British Prevention of Terrorism Act (Temporary Provisions), 1989 pt.
20.
16. See CLIVE WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW
5 (1980).
17. See id. at 5-6.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 34.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27-34.
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motive for the violence. For example, violence which is carried out
in order to preserve public order-for a legal purpose-will not be
deemed to be a violent act despite reflecting a similar violent nature
to an act of terrorism. Similarly, a person demonstrating against a
particular government policy will not be declared to be a terrorist,
despite the fact that he may fall within certain definitions of
terrorism. Generally, a consensus will exist as to what terrorism is
and is not, even though this agreement is not based on a formal
construction of this term. Accordingly, it seems that the above
definition should be qualified by the principle that violence
committed by entities charged with preserving public order and
safety, to the extent that these entities act lawfully, will not be
deemed as violent acts of terrorism.
An additional problem in categorizing terrorism is that terrorism
is treated in the same way as every other criminal offense. No
special distinction is drawn between terrorist offenses and other
23criminal offenses. If we fail to preserve the clear dichotomy
between a "regular" criminal offense and a "terrorist offense," there
is a danger that we will be unwillingly swept down a slippery
slope.24  Thus, a number of federal statutes in the United States
define terrorist acts as the threat to place a bomb.25 The definition in
the legislative proposals include all violent crimes, except for sex
offenses: assault with a dangerous weapon, assault causing grievous
bodily harm, and the offenses of kidnapping, manslaughter, creating
a risk of grievous bodily harm, causing an injury in the course of
destroying property, causing invalidity, and the like.
26
There are three elements essential to a liberal democratic
regime. The first is that there be a responsible government. Second,
that the rule of law prevail in the State, and third, that no prohibition
be imposed on legitimate political opposition to the regime.27
Accordingly, not all opposition to the existing regime may be
defined as terrorist activity, and caution should be exercised not to
23. See Wilson Finnie, Old Wine in New Bottles? The Evolution of Anti-
Terrorist Legislation, JURID. REV., 1990, at 1, 2-3.
24. See id. at 3-4.
25. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2000).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2000); Kopel & Olson, supra note 9, at 323.
27. See lain Cameron, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain
Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Second Report: "Freedom
and Security Under the Law," 48 MOD. L. REV. 201, 203 (1985).
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include permitted opposition within the framework of what is
prohibited. In contrast, it should be recalled that democracy is also
safeguarded by the preservation of security, and not only by the
preservation of rights and freedoms.
To conclude this section, it should be noted that in Israel there
are a number of statutes, which supply the State with tools to fight
terrorism. However, these statutes fail to define the term "terrorism"
or what will be regarded as a terrorist act.28 At the same time, the
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of 1948 defines a "terrorist
organisation" as "a body of persons resorting in its activities to acts
of violence calculated to cause death or injury to a person or to
threats of such acts of violence .... 2,,9 A "member of a terrorist
organisation" means "a person belonging to it and includes a person
participating in its activities, publishing propaganda in favour of a
terrorist organisation or its activities ... ,,30 These definitions are
lacking in the sense described above, in that they fail to distinguish
between "ordinary" crime, which is not a terrorist offense, and
terrorist offenses proper. These definitions do not sufficiently
delineate those activities that will be regarded as terrorism. Section 8
of the Ordinance provides that the government may declare a
particular body of persons to be a terrorist organization.3' To this
extent, it seems Israel adopted a concept similar to that followed in
Britain. Namely, that even if terrorism per se cannot be clearly
defined, at least those organizations which are manifestly terrorist
may be defined as terrorist organizations.
32
III. INTERROGATION OF TERRORISTS: WHAT IS PROHIBITED AND
WHAT IS PERMITTED
Today, terrorism poses an obstacle and a threat to humankind as
a whole without distinction of race, religion, gender or nationality. It
has become a global problem which challenges all the world's
communities. The services fighting terrorism generally carry out
their work in secret and with the least possible exposure of their
28. See Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948, K.T. 5708, 33, available
at http://www.ict.org.ilkounter ter/law/lawdet.cfm?lawid=1 1.
29. Id. at § 1.
30. Id.
31. See id. at § 8.
32. See infra text accompanying note 19.
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methods of operation, inter alia, so as to prevent terrorist groups
from developing ways of circumventing them. Nonetheless, it is the
very secrecy and clandestine nature of these services that create the
potential that these services will improperly use the powers available
to them.
33
The many attacks launched against Israel are a drop in the
bucket compared to the myriad of attempted terrorist acts prevented
by the Israeli government authorities in the fight against terrorism.
34
The General Secret Service (GSS) is the principal body responsible
for the fight against terrorism.35 In order to succeed at preventing
hostile enemy action, the GSS conducts investigations by collecting
all the relevant intelligence that may enable it to preempt and prevent
attacks.36 During these investigations the GSS also engages in
interrogations that involve physical force. 37 Recently, the High Court
of Justice in Israel heard a petition38 which raised the question of the
lawfulness of these interrogation techniques.3 9 The petition raised a
number of claims, some of them of a public nature. Inter alia, it was
contended that the GSS interrogators had no authority whatsoever to
interrogate persons suspected of terrorist activities. 4 It was asserted
that the GSS was not entitled to use means entailing moderate
physical pressure or non-violent psychological pressure, and that
those physical measures applied during the course of interrogations
infringed the human dignity of the suspect, and involved criminal
offenses contrary to international conventions prohibiting torture.4'
In light of this judgment, the question regarding the scope of the
prohibition on interrogations resorting to physical and psychological
measures arises more insistently. Is it indeed justified to prohibit
every type of physical interrogation, or is there perhaps merely a line
that cannot be crossed?
33. See Cameron, supra note 27, at 206.
34. See H.C. 5100/94, The Pub. Comm. against Torture in Israel v. The
State of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, available at http://www.derechos.org/human-
rights/mena/doc/torture.html [hereinafter The GSS Case].
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 843-44.
39. See id. at 823.
40. See id. at 824.
41. See id.
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Before identifying which measures may be employed and
whether those measures currently employed amount to torture, it is
necessary to examine what is deemed to be torture. There is no clear
and unequivocal definition of this term. According to Article 3 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights,42 there
is a distinction between "torture" and "inhuman or degrading
treatment." The article, however, fails to clarify the meaning of
torture.
43
Torture may be either physical or psychological. While physical
torture is bodily pain that is deliberately and directly caused,
psychological or mental torture injures the soul of a person. 44 The
form of the torture suffered by a person is irrelevant. The
assumption is that the individual will suffer both physical and mental
pain.
45
In the European Court of Human Rights, the majority opinion of
The Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom,46 held that the
difference between these categories ensued from the intensity of the
suffering. Torture is the deliberate use of inhumane treatment that
causes severe and cruel pain and suffering.47 In contrast, a number
of judges in the same case viewed the definition of torture in a
different manner. 48 The differences of opinion, also found among
the judges in the majority, leads to the conclusion that a
determination as to whether a particular act amounts to torture must
be left to the discretion and good sense of the parties involved.
Notwithstanding that the term has not been accorded a clear
definition, there are a variety of distinctions between different types
of torture that depend upon the purpose of the torture.4 9 Among the
42. See The European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3,
(stating that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."), available at http://www.hri.org/docs/
ECHR50.html.
43. See id.
44. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT-
ISRAEL'S INTERROGATION OF PALESTINIANS ,FROM THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 77-78 (1994).
45. See id.
46. 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978).
47. See id. at 80.
48. See id. at 108-09, 125, 127, 145.
49. See Daniel Stetman, The Question of Absolute Morality Regarding the
Prohibition on Torture, 4 LAW & GOV'T 161, 162 (1997).
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various types of torture, there is also interrogational torture and
terrorist torture. 50  Terrorist torture refers to torture aimed at
deterring those members of the group to which the suspect is
affiliated by instilling fear in the group so that they shall cease their
activities. Interrogational torture is the infliction of severe physical
or mental pain during the course of the interrogation, with the
purpose of extracting certain information from the suspect, and not
exclusively for the purposes of deterrence or instilling fear.
52
It should be pointed out that one dilemma in this context is
whether intelligence should be collected in such a way as to ensure
its later admissibility as evidence in court for the purpose of bringing
about the conviction of the terrorist, or whether intelligence should
also be gathered in ways which will make it inadmissible in future
legal proceedings if by so doing the terrorism will be stopped in its
tracks. It would seem that collecting information for the purpose of
preventing terrorism, even at the price of the terrorist escaping
conviction for all or some of his acts-by reason of the non-
admissibility of the evidence-is the preferable course of action.
This is also the distinction that may be drawn between an
investigation of a crime committed and completed, and the
investigation of a terrorist act that has not yet been perpetrated or has
just been initiated. In the former case, the interrogation is conducted
in order to uncover evidence for court. In the latter, the interrogation
is primarily directed at uncovering evidence which will assist in
preempting or preventing the attack.
IV. WHEN IS TORTURE MORALLY JUSTIFIED?
The very fact that the conventions, referred to above, provide no
exceptions to the definition of torture suggests that the prohibition on
torture is absolute. For example, there is an obligation not to torture.
However, there may be situations in which this obligation and a
separate, but equally moral obligation, carry the same weight. Yet, if
we start to qualify the absolute prohibition and draw a balance
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
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between conflicting obligations, this will detract from the
significance of the absolute nature of the moral obligation.
53
In contrast to the approach that moral obligations in general, and
the obligation not to torture in particular, are absolute in nature, there
is another approach which asserts that one should not be hasty to
attach the label "absolute" to moral obligations.54 Kant, for example,
was of the opinion that the duty to tell the truth is absolute, even if a
lie could save human life.55 This example, in the opinion of
Professor Daniel Stetman, clarifies why one should not declare a
moral obligation to be absolute.56 Under this theory, one possible
situation in which it may be morally possible to justify torture is the
case of the "ticking bomb."
The phrase "ticking bomb" refers to the situation where there is
no other choice but torture, in the limited period of time available, to
prevent anticipated damage.57 For example, where a bomb has been
activated or is due to be activated, there is no other choice but to
interrogate a suspect with the use of torture. The premise is that the
suspect knows details either directly or indirectly which may assist in
preventing damage or at least minimizing it. There are those who
see justification for the use of torture in the case of a ticking bomb as
part of their perception of"necessity.
5M
At the same time, it is not clear when a particular situation will
be regarded as a ticking bomb situation. This is because generally
there is only information about an abstract intention to lay a bomb,
and it is not known whether this intention is serious or immediate.
The "duration of the ticking" may theoretically be very long and on
occasion be only an empty threat. The investigators dealing with the
53. See id. at 166-68 (explaining why it is necessary to refrain from
applying the label "absolute" to any particular moral obligation).
Kant... [was of the opinion that] one must not lie even in order to
save an innocent man from the hands of a pursuer seeking to kill him.
But this position is unreasonable... and provides us with a warning
sign against applying the label "absolute" to a particular type of
required moral activity.
Id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 171-73.
58. Stetman proceeds from this starting point, and even from the
assumption that almost no one disputes this view. See id. at 166-68.
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suspect do not know for certain how much time they have to extract
relevant information from the suspect.
Further, the investigators do not know for certain what the
particular suspect knows. They can only make conjectures and
assumptions as to the nature of the answers to these questions, and
use their discretion to decide whether the case at hand indeed
requires the adoption of measures that are generally prohibited from
a moral point of view.5 9 Following the explosion in Oklahoma City
in 1995, the press indiscriminately described all terrorist militias as
ticking time bombs.60 Thus, in times of emergency or in times of
unstable security, any person who is suspected of being a terrorist
may be regarded as a ticking bomb, despite the lack of objective
evidence. Accordingly, it is necessary to exercise caution and
establish clearly and decisively the nature of the ticking bomb
situation, as well as setting clear limits on the duration of the ticking,
which will justify torture during interrogation. Otherwise, there is a
risk that the extraordinary ticking bomb situations will be divested of
meaning, and all circumstances will fall within that definition.
An additional problem is that from the moment it is decided that
the required information is in the suspect's possession, a situation
may arise where nothing said by that suspect will shift the
interrogators from their determination to interrogate him, and will
spur them on to greater efforts.
61
In order to enable justification of torture from a moral point of
view, the means of interrogation must be proportional to the situation
that it is hoped to prevent. Thus, justification for torturing the
suspect will increase in proportion to the greater and the more direct
the suspect's responsibility is for the crime that is about to be
committed.62
According to the utilitarian moral approach, in order to preserve
the maximum general good of society, the interrogator will, on
occasion, also have to breach values which he regards as right.
Professor M.S. Moore points out that the proponents of the theory of
59. See id. at 173 (adding to these difficulties).
60. See Kopel & Olson, supra note 9, at 282.
61. See Stetman, supra note 49, at 174. Stetman also points out that the
interrogators may torture with fervor simply in order to justify their existence,
without any real need for this type of interrogation. See id. at 178.
62. See id. at 185, 191.
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utilitarianism will never be consistent in preserving a rule such as
"never torture an innocent child. 63 In his opinion, it is forbidden to
torture or harm innocents, even if the result of that activity will be
that other lives are saved.64
V. THE DEFENSE OF NECESSITY VERSUS THE DEFENSE OF
JUSTIFICATION
On May 31, 1987, the government of Israel decided, as a result
of two cases, to establish a commission of inquiry which would
examine the methods used by the GSS in times of terrorist activity.
6 5
The first case concerned Nafsu, a lieutenant in the army, who was
accused of treason and espionage. Nafsu was convicted on the basis
of his confession, which was obtained by GSS investigators.
66
Following his conviction, he contended that his confession had been
coerced through torture.
67
The second case relates to the incident known as the Bus 300
Affair. In that incident, a bus was hijacked by terrorists. After
gaining control of the bus, GSS agents were seen capturing two
terrorists alive.68 Some time later it was stated that these terrorists
had been killed.69 The question that arose was how the terrorists
died if they were captured alive. These two cases led to a debate
regarding the investigative practices of the GSS in cases of terrorist
activity.
Ultimately, it was decided that this was an issue of great public
importance which had to be examined, and a decision was made to
set up a commission to inquire into the matter.7' In 1987, a
commission was established in Israel under the chairmanship of
63. M.S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV. 280,
291-93, 315 (1989).
64. See id.
65. REPORT OF THE COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE METHODS OF
INVESTIGATION OF THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE REGARDING HOSTILE
TERRORIST ACTIVITY, 1-3 (1987) [hereinafter THE LANDAU REPORT].
66. See Cr.A. 124/87, Nafsu v. Military Prosecutor Gen. 41(2) P.D. 631.
67. See id.
68. See Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism, supra note 14, at 106.
The case was never brought to trial. The President gave a pardon to the people
involved before the trial began. See id.
69. See id.
70. See generally THE LANDAU REPORT, supra note 65 (discussing the
Landau Commission's conclusions).
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Justice Landau charged with examining the investigative procedures
of the GSS in cases of terrorist activities, and the matter of giving
false testimony in court in relation to these investigations.
71
One of the conclusions of the commission was that even if the
interrogation methods of the GSS interrogators entailed torture, those
interrogators could avail themselves of the criminal law defense of
necessity.72 This determination has been the subject of extensive
criticism.73
A. The Defense of Necessity
The defense of necessity was created because when enacting any
law, and in particular a penal law, it is impossible to foresee all the
possible situations where breach of the law will be justified.
Accordingly, a number of defenses were recognized, including the
defense of necessity, to provide the necessary flexibility.74 The penal
law was shaped in such a way that every offense represents the
typical situation, which it is designed to prevent.75 The defense of
necessity was created in order to provide for the situation in which a
person commits an offense. However, from a social and moral point
of view, in light of the particular justification he had at the time of
committing the offense, it is undesirable that criminal liability be
imposed on him.76 The uniqueness of this defense ensues from its
amorphousness and broadness in relation to the question of when one
will be justified in breaching the law. Thus, making the defense
compatible with the concept underlying it follows the best possible
course of action in the circumstances of the case.77
71. See id. at 1-3.
72. This defense is prescribed today by section 34K of the 1977 Penal Law.
The language of the section today differs from its earlier formulation. For
example, the former section did not include the requirement of immediacy.
See The Penal Law, 1977, S.H. 226.
73. See Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism, supra note 14, at
106-07.
74. See id. at 108-09.
75. See The Penal Law 1977, S.H. 226.
76. See Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism, supra note 14, at 107.
77. See M. Kremnitzer & R. Segev, Exercising Force in GSS
Interrogations, LAW & Gov'T 667, 694 (1998).
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In the past, the defense of necessity did not require imminence
of the emergency situation that the action was sought to prevent.78
Extensive criticism was voiced at this position. Today, the
requirement of imminence has been incorporated into the law itself.
79
In the case of the ticking bomb as well, there is an element of
imminence, so that the interrogator may have available to him the
defense of necessity whether the timer is set for an hour later or for a
day later. So long as the interrogator does not know with certainty
how much time he has at his disposal in order to neutralize the
bomb-for him the danger could materialize at any minute-and
accordingly the danger is imminent.80
B. The Defense of Justification
In contrast to the defense of necessity which is available in cases
that cannot be anticipated in advance, the defense of justification is
available when a person acts in a manner contrary to the provisions
of the penal law, but where he does so for some justified reason
given to him before the commission of the offense. 81  Such
justification can be a statutory provision.82 The rationale behind this
defense is to enable people to act in accordance with the provisions
of various laws, the implementation of which they oversee, or, in
certain cases which may be anticipated, without fear that they may be
put on trial for such activity.
8 3
C. Which is More Appropriate - Necessity or Justification?
The Landau Report recognized the defense of necessity as an
appropriate defense for the GSS interrogators following a finding
78. The statement by the Report of the Law Commission Investigating the
Interrogation Techniques of the GSS that there was no need for the
requirement of immediacy, was clarified by the example of the ticking bomb.
It was contended there that it was immaterial if the timer of'the bomb was set
for five minutes later or five days later. See TE LANDAU REPORT, supra note
65, at 49-52.
79. See The Penal Law, 1977, S.H. 226.
80. See S.Z. Feller, Not Actual "Necessity" but Possible "Justification";
Not "Moderate" Pressure, but Either "Unlimited" or "None at All", 23 ISR.
L. REv. 201, 207 (1989).
81. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 16.03[B]
(2d ed. 1995).
82. See The Penal Law, 1977, S.H. 226.
83. See Feller, supra note 80, at 209-10.
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that torture had been employed during their interrogations. 84
However, is it actually the defense of necessity that is appropriate in
this situation? The answer seems to be-not inevitably.
The commission itself called for the enactment of legislation
which will authorize and justify the activities of the GSS in general,
and the form of interrogations of the GSS in particular.8 5 Reference
here is to recurrent and foreseeable situations. Accordingly, in
practice, the most appropriate defense in these cases is not the
defense of necessity, as was asserted, but rather the defense of
justification. As it is possible to foresee a broad range of possible
situations which may arise during the course of interrogations, it is
possible to reduce them to writing and subject them to a particular
standard, which will determine when the defense will arise. In
contrast, necessity is not given to standardization as the situations
which fall within this category cannot be foreseen.
86
An additional problem inherent in the defense of necessity
ensues from the lack of clarity as to when a situation is in the nature
of a "necessity." Every interrogator will interpret necessity in a
different manner. This lack of uniformity is problematic. In a
democratic state in which the rule of law prevails, and within the
principle of legality, it is necessary to specify clearly by statute the
boundaries of individual rights that the government should not
infringe upon. If it is desirable to provide for certain exceptions
enabling the infringement of individual rights, these too must be
prescribed by statute, as must be the identity of those entitled to
perform the infringement.
87
The contentions raised against statutory regulation of the
activities of the GSS, which would make the defense of justification
84. See supra text accompanying note 72.
85. See generally THE LANDAU REPORT, supra note 65 (discussing the
Landau Commission's activities).
86. See Feller, supra note 80, at 209; see also JOHN SMITH & BRIAN
HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 251-59 (8th ed. 1996).
87. See Mordechai Kremnitzer, The Landau Commission Report-Was the
Security Service Subordinated to the Law, or the Law to the "Needs" of the
Security Service?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 216, 237-39, 241-42 (1989). Today, in the
constitutional age, human rights determine the source of power of the
governmental authorities. It is necessary to draw a balance between
infringement of human rights and the rights themselves. See AHARON BARAK,
INTERPRETATION OF LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 3 86-88 (1994).
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available to the interrogators, include, inter alia, the contention that
in order to preserve the effectiveness of the interrogation it is
necessary to maintain the element of uncertainty. Accordingly, the
commission confirmed that it is possible to exert "moderate physical
pressure," but did not specify what is included within this phrase.
88
However, because it is not specified as to what is meant by moderate
physical pressure, the danger of over reaching again arises.
In addition, countering the contention that interrogations today
are not foreseeable, it is possible to document them to some extent.
This is because today many interrogation practices are known,
whether by reason of being documented in the case law itself, or by
reason of being attested to by persons who were the subject of
interrogations. Further, persons who have been interrogated once
will generally be interrogated again, so that they will know more or
less what is in store for them, and will know how to prepare mentally
for the interrogation. This partially weakens the contention that it is
necessary to preserve the secrecy of the interrogation practices in
order that the suspects will not know where they stand and what they
may expect.8 9 On the other hand, it is still arguable that so long as
the limits of what is permissible and what is prohibited in
interrogations have not been definitively established, the suspect will
still face an element of uncertainty.
An additional ground for asserting that there is no room for
statutory regulation of interrogation practices is that while use can
morally be made of extreme measures against a person, it is not
customary for a State to proclaim this in a statute, as Sanford H.
Kadish has pointed out.
90
Further, even if there is a statutory provision prohibiting the use
of cruel measures under any conditions, the interrogator will still
retain discretion whether or not to actually use them. Thus, a statute
prohibiting the use of these measures will in practice raise a greater
obstacle, in terms of which situation will be tested, but it will not
completely prohibit the use of these measures. In contrast, a statute
which permits the use of these measures in particular circumstances
will not educate people to follow a more desirable moral
88. See Feller, supra note 80, at 211.
89. See Kremnitzer & Segev, supra note 77, at 678.
90. See Sanford H. Kadish, Torture, the State and the Individual, 23 ISR. L.
REv. 345, 352-54 (1989).
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conscientious line, and the result hoped for will not be achieved.
Legislation which permits the adoption of these tactics and regulates
the answers to questions such as: In which situations is it permitted
to make use of these measures and for how long is it possible to
deprive a person of sleep, etc., will only worsen the existing
situation, likening it to the Middle Ages, when torture was regulated
by law.
91
Recently, this issue was discussed in the GSS Interrogation
Case, where it was stated:
[G]eneral directives governing the use of physical means
during interrogations must be rooted in an authorization
prescribed by law and not from defences to criminal
liability. The principle of "necessity" cannot serve as a
basis of authority .... If the State wishes to enable GSS
investigators to utilize physical means in interrogations,
they must seek the enactment of legislation for this purpose.
This authorization would also free the investigator applying
the physical means from criminal liability. This release
would flow NOT FROM THE "NECESSITY" DEFENSE BUT FROM
THE "JUSTIFICATION" DEFENCE .... The "necessity" defense
cannot constitute the basis for the determination of rules
respecting the needs of an interrogation. It cannot
constitute a source of authority on which the individual
investigator can rely for the purpose of applying physical
means in an investigation that he is conducting ....
92
VI. INTERROGATION PRACTICES IN ISRAEL
An investigation, by its very nature, places the suspect in a
strenuous position. Every investigation is a "battle of wits" in which
the investigator attempts to uncover the greatest possible number of
details about the suspect. Not all measures are legitimate in this
battle. It is necessary to determine which investigative procedures
91. See id. at 355-56. See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND
THE LAW OF PROOF (1977) (indicating that torture was part of the criminal
procedure and was regularly used as an investigative method).
92. The GSS Case, supra note 34, at 843-44 (emphasis added). It should be
noted that in that case it was not decided conclusively whether the defense,
which should be available to the interrogator, is the defense of necessity or the
defense of justification, and whether such a defense is actually valid.
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are permitted, and which are prohibited. In crystallizing the rules of
investigation, a balance must be drawn between two interests. On
one hand lies the public interest in uncovering the truth by exposing
offenses and preventing them; on the other hand, is the wish to
protect the dignity and freedom of the suspect.
A democratic, freedom-loving society does not accept that
investigators may use any means for the purpose of
uncovering the truth .... To the same extent, however, a
democratic society, aspiring to liberty seeks to fight crime
and to that end is prepared to accept that an interrogation
may infringe upon the human dignity and liberty of a
suspect provided it is done for a proper purpose and that the
harm does not exceed that which is necessary.
93
In addition to the conditions of imprisonment and detention,
which have an enormous impact on the mental state of the suspect,
during the course of interrogation of the person suspected of terrorist
activities, the GSS on occasion makes use of interrogation methods
which have recently been held by the High Court of Justice in Israel
to be prohibited. 94 These methods of interrogation include a number
of techniques such as the "Kasa'at at-tawlah" (which is intended to
cause painful stretching, using a table and direct pressure) or the
"Qumbaz" technique or "frog crouch" (where the suspect is forced to
crouch on tiptoe, with his hands tied behind his back. If the suspect
falls or tries to sit, he is forced to resume his crouching position).95
The State attempted to contend that some of the practices used
in the interrogation of terrorists were necessary in the circumstances
and were not designed to torture or cause suffering to the suspect.
96
Rather, they were asserted to be an integral part of the interrogation
itself, and were employed in order to ensure the safety of the
93. Id. at 834.
94. See id. at 845-47.
95. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, TORTURE AND ILL-
TREATMENT - ISRAEL'S INTERROGATION OF PALESTINIANS FROM THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 111-46 (1994) (describing physical means of
interrogation).
96. See id.
June 2002] 1179
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:1161
interrogation facility and in order to prevent the suspect from
attacking the interrogators as had happened in the past.
97
Until recently, the Court refrained from making decisions of
principle on such issues, judging each case on the merits and leaving
the issues of principle to a later time. In the judgment given recently,
these issues of principle were decided. The Court ruled that in
general torture or degrading treatment during interrogations was
prohibited.98 In addition, the Court held that GSS interrogators
conducting investigations possess the same powers as police officers
and enjoy no additional special powers.
99
The Court was willing to partially accept the explanations
proffered by the State in respect of the rationale underlying these
methods of interrogation, but not the explanations in their entirety.1
00
Thus, sitting is indeed an integral part of the interrogation, but not
sitting on a low chair inclined forward for long hours. Had it only
been sitting on a low chair, this could possibly have been seen as
legitimate in the power play of the interrogation. For example, the
imposition of legitimate psychological pressure on the suspect.
However, inclining the chair forward was an unfair and unreasonable
interrogation method. This measure violated the bodily integrity,
rights and dignity of the suspect beyond what was necessary.
VII. INTERROGATION PRACTICES IN BRITAIN
Investigations conducted by the security services in Britain are
not very different from those applied in Israel. 10 From 1971 to
1975, more than 1,100 people were killed and about 11,500 persons
were injured in Britain as a result of a steep climb in Irish terrorist
activities.10 2 The IRA stood behind these attacks. 0 3 Consequently,
persons suspected of involvement in activities of the IRA were
interrogated with the help of extraordinary investigative measures.
97. See B'TSELEM - THE ISRAELI INFORMATION CENTER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, TORTURE AS ROUTINE: THE METHODS
OF INTERROGATION OF THE GSS 17-18 (1998).
98. See The GSS Case, supra note 34, at 845-47.
99. See id. at 833-37.
100. See id.
101. See supra Part VI.
102. See The Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R.
25, 30 (1978).
103. See id. at 35, 42.
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As a result, a complaint was filed against Britain in the European
Court of Human Rights. 104 The resulting judgment dealt with five
investigative measures, which were termed "the five techniques."'
0 5
A description of these methods appears in the judgment of the
European Court:
(a) wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for
periods of some hours in a "stress position," described
by those who underwent it as being "spreadeagled
against the wall, with their fingers put high above the
head against the wall, the legs spread apart and the feet
back, causing them to stand on their toes with the
weight of the body mainly on the fingers;"
(b) hooding: putting a black or navy coloured bag over the
detainees' heads and, at least initially, keeping it there
all the time except during interrogation;
(c) subjection to noise: pending their interrogations,
holding the detainees in a room where there was a
continuous loud and hissing noise;
(d) deprivation of sleep: pending their interrogations,
depriving the detainees of sleep;
(e) deprivation offood and drink: subjecting the detainees
to a reduced diet during their stay at the centre and
pending interrogations.1
0 6
The investigators of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)
learned these interrogation methods in a training seminar conducted
in 1971.107 In a committee chaired by Sir Edmond Compton,
appointed in 1971, it was found that these techniques entailed an
improper use of investigative powers, but that they were not
brutal. 10 8 This conclusion drew sharp criticism and it was decided to
set up a new commission, chaired by Lord Parker of Waddington.
10 9
In 1972, this commission issued its report.110 The majority opinion
in the report found that it was not necessary to rule out the
104. See id. at 58.
105. Id. at 59.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 60.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
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implementation of these techniques on moral grounds."' Lord
Gardiner, who represented the minority opinion in the report,
asserted that even in "emergency terrorist conditions" these
interrogation methods were not justified from a moral point of
view."12  Notwithstanding, both majority and minority views held
that the techniques were illegal in terms of the domestic law
prevailing at the time.113 Concurrently with the publication of the
report, the then Prime Minister declared in Parliament that no further
use would be made of these techniques in Security Service
interrogations.
114
Some of the people interrogated with these techniques sued the
government of Britain for damages. Often, these suits were settled
out-of-court."
5
The interrogators who applied these techniques were not
subjected to disciplinary trials or criminal proceedings, and indeed
no steps whatsoever were taken against them.1 6 In April 1972, army
instructions in the form of RUC Force Order 64/72 were issued
prohibiting the use of massive force in all circumstances. 117 The
instructions clearly prohibited inhumane conduct, violence, use of
the five techniques, threats, and insults." 8 The crown prosecutor
also clarified that anyone infringing the prohibition in the order
would be subject to prosecution. 119 In 1973, new regulations in
relation to detention by the army emphasized the need for
appropriate conduct.1
2 0
The European Court held that while the majority of the articles
of the European Convention on Human Rights ("Convention") are
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at60--61.
115. See id. at 62-66. In a number of cases, the suspects suffered physical
harm and obtained compensation ranging from £200 to £25,000 depending on
the injuries suffered. For example, a person interrogated and suffering
physical injuries, who could prove that the injuries were caused during the
interrogation, obtained compensation in the sum of £14,000 by way of an out-
of-court settlement. See id. at 62-66, 73.
116. See id. at 66.
117. See id. at 70.
118. See id. at 70-71.
119. See id. at7l.
120. See id.
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not absolute and exceptions exist, Article 3 of the Convention,
12 1
which prohibits torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, left no
room for exceptions.
122
In the judgment, sixteen judges to one reached the conclusion
that the five techniques reached the degree of inhuman or degrading
treatment. 123 Thirteen judges to four held that these five techniques
did not amount to torture.124 Unanimously, it was decided that it was
not within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights to
order Britain to institute criminal or disciplinary proceedings against
Security Service investigators who infringed the provisions of Article
3 of the Convention.'
25
Members of the security services can indeed justify their
activities, as mentioned above, by relying on one of the criminal law
defenses. However, the very fact that a person is suspected of being
connected to terrorist activities does not confer a right to use deadly
force against him.
126
In contrast, according to the report of the European Commission
for the Prevention of Terrorism, which visited Britain in 1994, there
were no accounts of cases of torture and almost no accounts of cases
121. The European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3,
available at http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html.
122. See The Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R.
25, 79-80 (1978). Similarly, in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the provisions are not absolute and may be infringed in times
of crisis or emergency, apart from four obligations which may not be breached
irrespective of the circumstances. These include the right not to be subjected
to torture. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/UN-
covenant/. Indeed, international protection of human rights in times of crisis is
important, but it is possible to breach some international obligations on those
occasions. For the breach of covenants in emergency situations and the
prohibition thereof, see Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights
Treaties in Public Emergencies-A Critique of Implementation by the
European Commission and Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights
Committee of the United Nations, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1981).
123. See The Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R.
25, 107 n.46 (1978).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See R.J. Spjut, The 'Official' Use of Deadly Force by the Security
Forces Against Suspected Terrorists: Some Lessons from Northern Ireland,
PUB. L., Spring 1986, at 38, 39-41, 46.
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of brutality directed against persons arrested and interrogated. 127
Accordingly, it is perhaps possible to conclude that the interrogation
practices directed at degrading and torturing suspects has lessened
since the 1970s.
VIII. INTERROGATION PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES
In contrast to the descriptions of the various interrogation
methods applied in Britain and Israel against terrorists, extensive
descriptions are not available in the United States. In the United
States, there are accounts of different and more sophisticated
techniques. 12 8  However, today, following the terrorist attack on
September 11, 2001, the United States can no longer claim that this
is the norm. Accounts of interrogation techniques by Israelis and
others in the United States indicate that the techniques now applied
by the United States are not very different to those applied
elsewhere. 1
29
The prohibition on torture is entrenched in the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 ° The United States
also contends with extensive terrorist activities. But, the FBI does
not have authority to apply physical pressure during interrogations of
persons suspected of terrorist activities, or to deprive the suspect of
his right to meet an attorney, something which in present day
interrogations is denied.' 3 ' A retired senior FBI official has asserted
that the GSS interrogation methods are in effect a short-cut. 132 In his
view, it is not a smart move to bring a person to an interrogation and
extract information from him with blows. In his opinion, the smart
step is to reach these findings through sophisticated methods-by
laboratory work, eavesdropping, following people, advanced
127. See B'TSELEM-THE ISRAELI INFORMATION CENTER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, LEGISLATION ALLOWING THE USE OF
FORCE AND MENTAL COERCION IN INTERROGATIONS BY THE GENERAL
SECURITY SERVICE 50 (2000) [hereinafter B'TSELEM, LEGISLATION
ALLOWING THE USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE].
128. See id. at 48.
129. See id.
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.")
(emphasis added).
131. See B'TSELEM, LEGISLATION ALLOWING THE USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE,
supra note 127, at 48.
132. Seeid. at51.
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technology, and infrared cameras. 133 Further, in his view, the GSS
will in most cases not obtain usable or credible information by the
use of violent interrogation methods.13 4 Were this FBI official to be
questioned today about interrogation practices in the United States
following the massive terrorist attack, it is not certain that he would
voice the same view.
The authority of the FBI is derived from the authority of the
Attorney General to appoint people to investigate crimes committed
against the United States, and to help the President conduct
investigations concerning official matters under the supervision of
the Judiciary and the State Department.
135
In the past, when the FBI implemented its powers, injustice was
often justified on the grounds of state security. 136 Ultimately, in
1976, when this injustice was acknowledged, internal security
guidelines were set for the FBI. This provided for particular
standards and investigation procedures preventing infringements of
the rights of innocent persons. 137 These guidelines were revised in
1983.138 Some of the guidelines were not publicized but remained
under wraps. Likewise, the guidelines on how to investigate
international terrorist activities were kept secret. 139 Executive Order
12,333 empowers the FBI to investigate these types of terrorist
activities on the basis of these secret guidelines.
140
It seems that with the collapse of the Twin Towers, the situation
in the United States changed. In consequence of the new situation,
legislation known as "Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT)" was legislated at
133. See id.
134. See id. at 48, 51-52, 55.
135. See John T. Elliff, The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI
Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 786 (1984).
136. See Melissa A. O'Loughlin, Note, Terrorism: The Problem and the
Solution-the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, 22 J. LEGIS.
103, 104 (1996).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 104 n.15; see also Elliff, supra note 135, at 785.
139. See Elliff, supra note 135, at 791.
140. See id. at 786, 791-92. It is asserted that by reason of this covert
activity, the FBI must remain a body which enjoys the confidence of the public
and Congress, and accordingly must be an apolitical body. See id. at 814.
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record speed.14 ' The Act broadens investigation powers1 42 and
defines cooperation in investigations.1 43 In addition, the Secretary of
State may grant a reward for information about terrorism.144
By this, the United States has joined countries such as Britain
and Israel which have a real and immediate need to obtain
information about future terrorist activities. The test of time has
shown that the United States too can no longer stand by its former
position in light of the attacks which it has recently suffered. It
would seem that if a state, which is as politically, economically, and
physically strong as the United States, cannot, in light of the real and
daily threat of terrorist attacks, adhere to its former position of calm
investigation practices, no state can.
IX. INTERROGATION PRACTICES IN CANADA
In contrast to the interrogation methods applied in Israel and
Britain and today in the United States, in Canada the interrogation
methods are based on the gathering of intelligence. 145  Until the
March 1976 trial in which Ralph Samson, a former constable in the
141. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA
PATRIOT Act), H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001); Uniting and Strengthening
America Act, S. 1510, 107th Cong. (2001).
142. See H.R. 3162 § 506 (expanding the power of the United States Secret
Service); S. 1510 § 507.
143. See H.R. 3162 § 330.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President should direct the
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of the
Treasury, as appropriate, and in consultation with the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to seek to enter into
negotiations with the appropriate financial supervisory agencies and
other officials of any foreign country the financial institutions of
which do business with United States financial institutions or which
may be utilized by any foreign terrorist organization... any person
who is a member or representative of any such organization, or any
person engaged in money laundering or financial or other crimes.
Id. But see S. § 1510 (the proposed language of House Bill 3162 does not
appear Senate Bill 15 10 as introduced, engrossed, or presented).
144. See H.R. 3162 § 501 (stating "[flunds available to the Attorney General
may be used.., to combat terrorism and defend the Nation against terrorist
acts"); S. 1510 § 502.
145. See Daniel Cayley Chung, Internal Security: Establishment of a
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 234, 234-35
(1985).
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Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) testified, there was no
knowledge of any violations whatsoever of rights during the course
of intelligence gathering. 146 In that trial, for the first time, it was
revealed that the RCMP, which, inter alia, is responsible for the
security of Canada, had engaged in a number of activities that either
deviated from their powers or were altogether unlawful. 47 For
example, the RCMP would kidnap followers of persons suspected of
being terrorists and force them to turn into informers.' 48 The
organization also unlawfully invaded individual privacy by opening
mail and trespassing without any authorization. 149  Following the
exposure of these activities, a commission was set up with the task of
examining which measures taken by the RCMP were unlawful or
unauthorized, and provide recommendations as to desirable
reforms.
50
The initial commission report was issued in July 1977, and was
followed by an additional two reports.' 5' The second report of the
Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police entitled Freedom and Security Under the
Law,152 sets out five basic and important principles that must be
followed when collecting any intelligence. These principles are:
(1) preservation of the rule of law; (2) proportionality between the
investigative means and the gravity of the threat - the investigative
means must be proportional to the threat being faced; (3) a balance
must be drawn between the investigative techniques required and the
possible damage to freedoms and rights, on one hand, and the gain
which society will earn from that investigation, on the other; (4) the
more injurious the investigative means, the higher the authority that
should be required to approve its use; and (5) except in the case of an
emergency, the least intrusive techniques of intelligence gathering
must be used before more intrusive techniques. 5 3 This must be the
146. See id. at 234-36.
147. See id.
148. See id. (discussing unlawful activities of the RCMP).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. at236-37.
152. See COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVrIES OF
THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY UNDER
THE LAW, SECOND REPORT 513-14 (1981).
153. See id.
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normal rule, however, in emergency situations where it is only
possible to obtain the information by using more intrusive
techniques. It is possible to make direct use of those techniques,
without requiring a graduated approach.1
54
The second Commission report states that while the protection
granted by the intelligence service to the State is important, it would
be wrong for its activities to derogate from the basic values of
democracy and essential freedoms.155 The activities of the service
cannot be an "open book" for all. However, they can be subject to
the oversight, for example, of the responsible Ministers. Likewise,
the opposition must be allowed to know about these activities in
order to preclude their possible exploitation by the government and
responsible Ministers against opposition members and legitimate
political activities targeting the existing regime. Thus, police and
security officials are not above the law, and ought not to be allowed
to breach the law in the name of state security.
156
X. CAPTURING TERRORISTS OR THE STATUS OF TERRORISTS
International law distinguishes between those who participate in
the armed conflict and those who do not.157 The various Geneva
Conventions also distinguish between those who take an active part
in the fighting itself, and those who do not.1 58 Thus, a civilian who
does not belong to the armed forces and is not a combatant has a
different status to that of a civilian fighting against someone whom
he regards as his enemy. Generally, soldiers fall within the
definition of combatants; however, members of other armed militias
also come within this category.' 59  Civilians are protected in
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 44-45.
157. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
Dec. 7, 1978, art. 50, 1125 U.N.T.S. 4, 26 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
1978]; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, 75 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
1949].
158. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
159. See 2 HOWARD S. LEvIE, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL 1
TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 375 (1980) (quoting in Article 41,
adopted by Committee III on May 31, 1976,
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situations where a struggle is underway, and the countries
participating in the war must prevent any possible harm or suffering
to the civilian population. The Geneva Conventions also recognize
another status-the status of prisoners of war-which embraces
combatants who have been captured by the enemy during the course
of the war.160 The state holding these prisoners of war must ensure
that the rights of the captured combatants, as enumerated in the
Conventions, are properly upheld. The various Geneva Conventions
do not refer to the legal status of civilians who do not fall within the
term "combatants," but nonetheless take an active part in the
fighting. 161 This phenomenon receives no mention whatsoever in the
various Geneva Conventions. It is possible to understand the silence
of the conventions regarding this situation as a negative arrangement
and not as a lacuna, i.e., as a deliberate statutory silence upon the
issue as opposed to an oversight.
The attempts by Palestinian terrorists over many years to be
regarded as freedom fighters, and therefore to be entitled to the status
of prisoners of war, have been consistently rejected by the courts in
Israel.162 Notwithstanding that the idea of regarding "freedom
fighters" as combatants for every purpose was not adopted or agreed
to in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, when these were formulated,
appreciation of the need for such recognition grew.163 Thus, in 1977,
this issue was added to Protocol 1 of the original Geneva
The armed forces of a party to a conflict consist of all organized
armed forces, groups, and units which are under a command
responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if
that party is represented by a government or an authority not
recognized by an adverse party.)
160. See Geneva Convention 1949, supra note 157, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who
have fallen into the power of the enemy: (1) Members of the
armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
Id.
161. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3,75 U.N.T.S. 287, 297-300.
162. See H.C. 2967/00, Batya Arad v. The Israel Knesset (unpublished, on
file with author).
163. JUDITH GAiL GARDAM, NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY AS A NoRM OF
INTERNATIONAL HuMANrrARLAN LAW 100 (1993).
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Conventions.164 The international community expanded the
protection of the Geneva Conventions so as to apply them also to
combatants who are not members of the official armed forces.
165
As noted, the Geneva Conventions were amended so as to
embrace a new class of combatants who were not recognized as
combatants under the classic structure of wars in Europe.166 The
Conventions granted them the rights of prisoners of war, on the
condition that they conducted themselves in accordance with the
rules applicable to combatants in international law.
167
Thus, at best, the Palestinian terrorist organizations may be
deemed to be para-military groups in accordance with Article 43.3 of
Protocol 1. According to this article, if one party is interested in
including such organizations within its armed forces, it must notify
the other party of the same, a notification which to date has not been
made by the Palestinian Authority. 168 Moreover, these terrorist
organizations initiate their attacks from the heart of the civilian
population, contrary to the provisions of Article 44.3 of Protocol
1 .169 The purpose of this provision is to protect the civilian
population and not to encourage combatants to make manipulative
use of the civilian population as a cover.170 The desire of the drafters
of Protocol I to find a just balance between the expansion of the term
"combatants" so as also to include "freedom fighters," and to
distinguish between them and civilians, was not simple to fulfill.'
7 '
The final formulation of the Protocol clearly shows that the
protection of the interests of the civilian population was preferred
over full protection of the rights of the freedom fighters. 172 The
requirements that those freedom fighters refrain from mingling with
164. See id. at 100-06 (reviewing the debate prior to the adoption of the
Protocol).
165. Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
protocol 1, art. 43, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 23 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 1977].
166. See GARDAM, supra note 163, at 56.
167. See Geneva Convention 1977, supra note 165 ("inter alia, shall enforce
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict");
see also, LEVIE, supra note 159, at 377.
168. See LEVIE, supra note 159.
169. See id. at 544-45.
170. See id. at 378-545 (discussing the adoption of Article 44).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 378, 544-45.
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the civilian population, that they wear uniforms or other distinct
identification and carry their weapons openly, were drafted
specifically in order to ensure that the other parties to the conflict
would know against whom they were fighting. This would avoid
harm to civilians who were not combatants. The exception to these
requirements in the provision is not applicable to Israel's situation
under discussion here.
Israel, the United States, and Britain have all refused to sign
Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1977.173 This Protocol
expanded the definition of combatants who are entitled to the rights
that the Convention also grants to freedom fighters.174
Israel and the United States objected to signing the Protocol and
accepting it as binding, inter alia, on the grounds that the Article
under discussion would enable terrorist organizations to be
recognized as combatants, and thereby allow them to be granted the
rights of prisoners of war.175 In their view, it was not desirable to
grant terrorists certain rights, such as the right not to be tried for their
actions. 176 Professor Frits Kalshoven, who participated in the 1985
panel on the question, "Should the Law of War Apply to Terrorists?"
177 asserted that terrorist organizations and terrorists are not entitled
to the status of combatants:
In these circumstances, a simple statement that the law of
armed conflict is applicable to terrorists seems of little
practical utility. Who would be bound by such an
173. See Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Additional Protocols
of June 8, 1977: Ratifications, Accessions and Successions, Int'l Comm. Of the
Red Cross (Dec. 3, 2001) (listing states which have signed the Geneva
Conventions and ancillary Protocols), at http://www.icrc.org/eng/partygc#4
(last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
174. See Geneva Convention 1949, supra note 157, art. 4, 75 U.N.T.S. at
138, (defining a combatant); see also Geneva Convention 1977, supra note
165, art. 43-44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23 (prescribing treatment of combatants and
prisoners of war).
175. See Cristopher C. Burris, Re-Examining the Prisoner of War Status of
PLO Fedayeen, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 943, 976 (1997).
176. See id.; see also Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law,
and the Use of Military Force, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 145, 190-91 (2000)
(evaluating the arguments justifying the use of military force against terrorists
and states that support them).
177. See Antigoni Axenidou, Should the Law of War Apply to Terrorists?,
79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 109 (1985) (publishing the panel discussions).
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instrument, and to what effect? Would, for instance, the
authorities acquire any additional legal powers that they do
not already possess under their constitutional provisions?
Would they become bound to respect any special rights of
terrorists not ensuing from existing human rights
instruments? Again, are we to assume that terrorists must
respect the law of armed conflict-with its express
prohibition on acts of terror? Or that they would become
entitled to a special status upon capture - a status that
governments rejected even for an internal armed conflict?
All these questions are purely rhetorical. In other
words, my answer to the question of whether the laws of
war should be made applicable to the activities of terrorists
in situations where they are at present inapplicable is:
No.
178
The definition of "civilians" and "civilian population" appears in
Article 50 of Protocol 1 to the 1977 Geneva Convention:
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of
the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 (A)
(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in
Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a
person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to
be a civilian.
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are
civilians.
3. The presence within the civilian population of
individuals who do not come within the definition of
civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian
character. 1
79
Because these definitions are formulated in the negative, one could
think that if certain persons do not fall within the category of
combatants, they must be civilians. However, it would be wrong to
interpret the article in this way as the drafters of the Geneva
Convention did not intend to grant terrorists the status of civilians.
178. Id. at 118.
179. The Geneva Convention, 1978, supra note 157, art. 50, 1125 U.N.T.S.
at 26.
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Additionally, the defenses granted to civilians are broader than
the defenses granted to combatants. Thus, for example, it is
forbidden to attack civilian populations. 8 ' It follows that if it is not
proper to regard terrorists as combatants, thereby granting the
terrorists the protection due to combatants, afortiori it is improper to
regard terrorists as civilians who are not combatants, and grant them
even more extensive rights.
At the same time, when terrorists are captured they are not
entitled to the rights of prisoners of war. However, they are entitled
to the minimum rights to which all men are entitled. Among these
rights is the right to preserve the human dignity of the terrorist.'
8 1
As terrorists are not entitled to immunity from legal proceedings
for their crimes, they may, by way of analogy to the position of
prisoners of war, continue to be held in preventive detention until the
cessation of "hostilities" with the terrorist organization to which they
belong. In effect, detention neutralizes the captured terrorists in the
war. Thus, in Israel, it is possible to detain terrorists who have
completed their sentences, in preventive detention which is known as
"administrative detention," in reliance, on the Emergency Powers
(Detention) Law of 1979.182 Under this law, terrorists who, if
released, may revert to engaging in terrorist activities against Israel,
may be held in Israel. Recently, the Supreme Court of Israel had to
consider the question of whether terrorists may be held as bargaining
chips. 183 The Court held that the particular terrorist had to pose a
risk and could not be held simply as a negotiating tool, but rather his
detention had to ensue from the dangers posed by his release.184 In
the absence of such a danger the terrorist had to be released. 185 It
should also be noted that preventive detention, such as administrative
180. See id. art. 51, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
181. See James P. Rowles, Military Responses to Terrorism: Substantive and
Procedural Constraints in International Law, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
287, 312 (1987).
182. Emergency Powers Detention Law, 1979, S.H. 76.
183. See Further Hearing [FH] 7048/97 Anon v. Minister of Defence, 54(1)
P.D. 72.
184. See id.
185. See id. But see Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism and The
Problem of Administrative Detention in Israel: Does a Democracy Have the
Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips, 18 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
721, 721 (2001) [hereinafter Gross, Human Rights].
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detention in Israel, is also implemented in the United States. In the
past such detention was anchored in the immigration laws.'86 Those
laws also provided for the possibility of deporting the detainees to
third countries. Today, the detention provisions in the immigration
laws have been amended by Section 412 of the new USA PATRIOT
Act.'
87
XI. TARGETED KILLINGS AS SELF-DEFENSE
Israel engages in targeted preemptive actions by killing persons
who comprise a real and concrete threat to Israel, its security, and the
safety of its civilians. 188 These actions are performed in self-defense
and as a last resort only. Israel attempts not to injure the innocent by
focusing on terrorists in isolation from their environment and by
targeting persons on whom there is intelligence proving that they are
actively involved in terrorist activities against Israel. It should be
pointed out that these preemptive acts are only permitted as a last
resort where there is no possibility of capturing the terrorist alive.
We shall now consider whether such an act can be deemed to be an
act of self-defense in view of international law and the law
applicable in the United States.
A basic rule of customary international law, which was later also
adopted in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter, is that in the settlement of
any dispute which may threaten world peace and security, an attempt
must first be made to resolve the dispute by peaceful means.
89
Among the means available to states are negotiations, investigations,
mediation, consultations, arbitration, and other legal measures.
190
Self-defense in customary international law is embodied in a
doctrine known as the "Caroline Doctrine,"'191 which has been
expressed by the well-known statement that: "[T]he necessity of that
186. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, 1531-37 (2000).
187. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 350.
188. See Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense
(A Call to AmendArticle 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 HOUS. J. INT'L
L. 25, 39-40 (1987).
189. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
190. See Colloquy, Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 287, 289 (1987).
191. See Robert F. Teplitz, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did (he
United States Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi
Plot to Kill George Bush?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 569, 578 (1995).
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self-defense is instant, over-whelming, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation.' 19
According to Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter,
member states of the U.N., including Israel, are prohibited from
using any force against another state: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."'
193
This provision is directed at member states of the U.N., but the
standards contained therein also apply to states that are not member
states, by virtue of customary international law.194 It is not clear
whether this provision also prohibits the activities of individuals such
as terrorists. 195 As an exception to the rule prohibiting the use of
force, Article 51 permits the use of force in self-defense:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken
by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.1
96
In the case of Nicaragua v. United States of America,197 the
International Court of Justice adopted the approach that terrorist
192. Alberto R. Coil, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses
to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 287,301 (1987).
193. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
194. See Federica Bisone, Comment, Killing a Fly With a Cannon: The
American Response to the Embassy Attacks, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 93, 98 (2000).
195. See id.
196. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
197. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986, I.C.J. 14
(June 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/
isummaries/inussummary860627.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
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activities do not amount to an "armed attack."'198 However, this
interpretation may in fact be used as a cover and legitimization for
various terrorist activities since, under this interpretation, a state
cannot defend itself against those terrorist acts. In this way, terrorists
and states supporting them are given a direct advantage over
democratic states. 199 One opinion today holds that in light of the fact
that the world and military capabilities have changed in recent years,
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter should be interpreted in a broader
manner.
200
Attacks by terrorist organizations may be extremely destructive.
Logic holds that when a terrorist attack is about to be launched, the
state under attack may take action, including the use of force against
those responsible, in order to prevent the anticipated future harm.
20 1
This policy has also been called "active defense."
20 2
According to a different view, individual isolated terrorist
attacks, which are not consecutive or continuous, cannot be deemed
to be an armed attack.20 3 The negative rule teaches us the positive
rule. Thus, under this approach, if the terrorist attacks are continuous
and are not one-time acts, the repeated attacks will attain the status of
an armed attack. Moreover, there is an approach that sees terrorist
attacks as actually falling within the definition. As terrorism may be
deemed to be an indirect act of aggression by the state that hosts the
terrorists, and as the language of Article 51 does not require that the
armed attack be direct, indirect activities of this type may also be
deemed to be an armed attack.20 4
The United States has interpreted Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
as embracing three types of self-defense:
1. Self-defense in the face of the real use of force or
hostile actions;
198. Id.
199. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in
International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and The National Defense, 126 MIL.
L. REv. 89, 91, 95-96 (1989).
200. See Jami Melissa Jackson, Comment, The Legality of Assassination of
Independent Terrorist Leaders: An Examination of National and International
Implications, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG., 669, 682 (1999).
201. See Sofaer, supra note 199, at 95.
202. Id.
203. See Rowles, supra note 181, at 314.
204. See Baker, supra note 188, at 41-43, 47-48.
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2. Self-defense as a preventive action in the face of
immediate activities where it is anticipated that force
will be used; and
3. Self-defense in the face of a persistent threat.2 °5
The International Court of Justice cannot compel states to abide by a
standard which effectively prevents these states from defending
themselves against anticipated terrorist attacks that may lead to large
scale destruction and multiple victims.
20 6
One case in which the United States was involved concerned the
1992 attempted assassination of former U.S. President George Bush,
during a visit to Kuwait, by Iraqi government officials. 20 7 Then
President Bill Clinton ordered an attack on Baghdad; the target
chosen was a building occupied by the Iraqi intelligence service.0 8
This attack also involved injury to civilians.2 9 The United States
expressed regret and declared that the attack had been carried out at a
time when fewer people were expected to be in the vicinity of the
facility.210 The attack was properly reported to the U.N. and was
explained as an act of self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter.21' In response, the U.N. Ambassador from Iraq
charged the United States with an attempt to convict Iraq without
evidence.
2 12
The U.N. response discloses a lack of understanding of the
significance of the claim of self-defense. It does not refer to an
action the purpose of which is punitive, but rather one whose purpose
is preventive. Namely, the purpose of self-defense is to prevent a
possible attack or harm to a state or its citizens. In the above case,
the United States attacked Iraq with the purpose of preventing the
assassination of President Bush as a former head of state.213 The
threat to his life was genuine and immediate. It was also argued that
this action was essential in order to foil Saddam Hussein's plan, in
view of the fact that he was known to be a man who could not be
205. See Jackson, supra note 200, at 683.
206. See Sofaer, supra note 199, at 97-98.
207. See Teplitz, supra note 191, at 601-03.
208. See id. at 603-04.
209. See id. at 604-05.
210. See id. at 605 n.287.
211. See id. at 606.
212. See id. at 606-07.
213. See id. at 610.
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persuaded by diplomatic or non-military means. 4 Moreover, had
the United States publicly called upon Iraq to prevent Bush's death,
Iraq would have attempted to assassinate him sooner than originally
planned. With regard to the demand for proportionality, an attempt
to assassinate Saddam Hussein would have been a proportional
response from the point of view of "an eye for an eye." However,
such an act would not have been legal, either as a matter of
international law or as a matter of domestic U.S. law, by reason of
the prohibition on assassinating political figures or leaders of foreign
states.
2 16
The situation in Israel is one of repeated terrorist attacks, which
collectively may be regarded as an armed attack. Accordingly, as
long as the defensive act of Israel is adopted as a last ditch measure
and accompanied by an effort to resolve the dispute by peaceful
means, treaty law permits it.
According to the judgment in the Nicaragua case, the minimum
conditions which must exist in order to allow an army to respond to a
terrorist attack include: (1) that the nation carefully evaluate the
evidence to ensure a high degree of certainty that it has identified
those responsible for an attack and that more attacks are imminent;
(2) that the facts relied upon be made public; and (3) that the facts
are subject to international scrutiny and investigation.
217
It is not realistic to further demand that decisions in respect to
preemptive actions, which involve the use of force against terrorists,
be open to public oversight. It also cannot be expected that a
disclosure of the intention to carry out a preemptive action will
become a compulsory standard. States will not be eager to expose
intelligence sources in order to provide absolute justification of the
defensive action. On the other hand, a state cannot argue self-
defense without any public justification whatsoever. 218 An unbiased
body must be established that will examine the security decisions and
authorize them on the basis of the appropriate level of evidence.
214. See id. at 611.
215. See id. at 611-12.
216. See id.; Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
217. See Jules Lobel, Colloquy: The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist
Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 547
(1999).
218. See Sofaer, supra note 199, at 105, 121.
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There are some who argue that there is a presumption that the right
terrorists will be found in the course of the preemptive action since,
otherwise, the political consequences of that preventive action would
be unfavorable for the defending state.
219
When, therefore, will a state under attack be permitted to defend
itself by taking action within the territory "hosting" the terrorists?
Such an action may be taken in one of the following situations:
1. Where the foreign state does not wish to extradite the
terrorists.
2. Where there is no convention regarding extradition
between the two states concerned.
3. Where the terrorist has not breached the law of the
state in which he is present. i
4. Where the extradition request will disclose to the
terrorist that he is being sought and therefore that it
behooves him to escape. In other words, where it is
desired to hide from the terrorist the fact that his
extradition is being sought, since otherwise he would
escape capture.
5. In situations where a civil war is underway in the host
state or it is subject to social chaos, and there is no
strong governmental body capable of fighting and
stopping those known terrorists operating from within
the territory of the state.22 °
Similarly, in a situation where there is hostility or war between
states, it is not realistic to expect that one state will extradite
terrorists to another. When one of these situations occurs, the
likelihood is that no peaceful resolution of the problem will be
possible. This is because no extradition arrangement exists nor is
there any way of extraditing the terrorists, apart from the situation
where it is hoped to conceal from the terrorist the fact that he is being
sought. Despite all this, an attempt must initially be made to find a
peaceful way of resolving the problem. An attempt should be made
to request the host state to prevent the terrorist activities, or in the
219. See Coil, supra note 192, at 300.
220. See id. at 305; see also Boyd M. Johnson III, Note, Executive Order
12,333: The Permissibility of an American Assassination of a Foreign Leader,
25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 401,420 (1992).
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alternative, permission must be sought from that state to act within
its territory.2 21 Only if there is no other choice may the defending
state engage in permissible self-defense. 222  With regard to the
requirement that peaceful measures first be attempted to resolve the
dispute, for example, by engaging in negotiations with the terrorist
organization prior to attacking it, it should be noted that terrorist
organizations generally also commit crimes against humanity.223
Thus, there is no reason to conduct negotiations with such
organizations apart from cases where talks are essential for the
release of hostages and kidnapped persons. As terrorist
organizations do not represent states and are not structured like
states, they do not have the necessary structures in place for such
negotiations, and even if agreements are reached, they cannot be
enforced save by military means. 224 Submitting the dispute to an
international tribunal would lead to similar difficulties.
On the other hand, as terrorist organizations do not represent
states, the weapon of economic sanctions, which is generally
employed against states violating international agreements, would
also be ineffective.225 There are no effectual means of ensuring that
agreements will be implemented by terrorist organizations.
Likewise, the international courts can be of no assistance as again the
dispute is not one being waged between two states.
226
In addition to an attempt to resolve the conflict by peaceful
means, there is a requirement that if these means fail, measures must
be selected that are proportional to the activities sought to be
prevented.22 7 In the same way that fighting a war must be conducted
with weapons which minimize the damage resulting from their use,
so too proportionality must be ensured in activities aimed at foiling
terrorist attacks. This means that it is necessary to consider whether
the preemptive attack will cause greater harm balanced against the
potential for harm that the commission of the terrorist attack will
cause. For example, attacking terrorist bases and camps may be
221. See Coil, supra note 192, at 305.
222. See id.
223. See Jackson, supra note 200, at 684-85.
224. See id. at 685.
225. See Coil, supra note 192, at 303.
226. See Jackson, supra note 200, at 684-85, 693-94.
227. See id. at 688-89.
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beneficial in immediately preventing a terrorist act, but it may also
result in injury to innocent people.228 This factor must be weighed
before deciding which preemptive measure to implement.
In addition to the requirement of proportionality, it is necessary
that the preemptive measures cause the least possible harm.22 9 If it is
possible to preempt the terrorist act by taking other actions which are
less harmful, and which entail less risk to the forces of the defending
state, these must be taken. Thus, for example, destroying terrorist
infrastructure by bombing a terrorist training camp is justified as a
legal act of self-defense according to the U.N. Charter.
230
However, while such an act may perhaps prevent attacks in the
immediate future, they may prove futile in the long term as, despite
the destruction of the infrastructure, the terrorists themselve§ still
pose a real threat and can immediately recover by establishing new
training sites.2 31  In particular, such a measure is unsatisfactory
where one is concerned with suicide terrorists, where only an attack
against them or their commanders will prevent them from
implementing their designs.
The law and national policy of the United States prohibit
assassinations. 232 The U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10 on the Law of
Land Warfare provides that political assassination is a war crime,
and therefore anyone breaching this prohibition in times of war is
liable to be tried for his acts.2 33 The explanation that this act is
carried out in the context of self-defense will not be accepted. This
is the case under the law of the United States in times of war.
However, in a situation that is not one of manifest war, such as
the United States' attempt to foil the activities of Osama bin Laden,
one of the most notorious terrorist leaders in the world, it is not clear
which law applies. Executive Order 12,333 (the "Order") provides
that no person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States'
Government may be involved in an act of political assassination.
234
The policy prohibiting political assassinations was initiated during
228. See Baker, supra note 188, at 46-47.
229. See ASSA CASHER, MILirARY ET-ICS 57-58 (1996).
230. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
231. See Jackson, supra note 200, at 689.
232. See id. at 671.
233. See id. at 672.
234. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
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President Gerald Ford's term in office, as a consequence of CIA
involvement in the assassination of a number of foreign leaders.
2 35
The Order, however, does not define what would be considered to be
236a prohibited political assassination. It has been argued that as the
Order was issued following the assassination of a number of foreign
government officials, and because bin Laden is not a head of state or
the political representative of any state, the prohibition on
assassinations does not apply to terrorists such as bin Laden.
237
Assassination is defined as illegal homicide for a political purpose.
238
Existing definitions of the term "assassination" contain the word
"murder" or words having a similar meaning.239 The majority of the
definitions also include the requirement that the homicide be for a
political purpose.
240
Thus, killing in the course of war will be deemed to be an
assassination if two cumulative conditions are met: first, that the aim
of the action is to kill the particular person and second, that the
killing is undertaken through the use of treacherous fighting tactics.
If one of these conditions is not met, then there is no assassination.
24 1
Every assassination is prohibited under the law. However, not
every homicide is an assassination. Even a homicide that is not the
result of necessity, during the course of war, will not necessarily be
deemed to be an assassination or a targeted killing if the element of
treacherous conduct is missing. A breach of the requirement that the
action be proportional will also not inevitably cause the action to be
regarded as an assassination. Thus, the killing of an individual on
the grounds of self-defense will not be regarded as an
assassination.
242
There are four ways of evading the prohibition on assassinations
that rely on a number of loopholes in the Order. The first is by
235. See Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 43
MERCER L. REv. 615, 631-37 (1991).
236. See id. at 635.
237. See Jackson, supra note 200, at 674.
238. See Zengel, supra note 235, at 636.
239. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 114 (6th ed. 1990); MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 68 (10th ed. 2000).
240. See Sofaer, supra note 199, at 116-17.
241. See Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International
and Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 632 (1992).
242. See id. at 639-41, 645.
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declaring open war.243 However, even in time of war, civilians who
do not take part in the war should not be killed. Second, while it is
possible to kill military leaders in time of war as part of the war, it is
doubtful whether it is legal to kill civilian leaders who are also
military leaders.244 If a state of war is not declared, use may be made
of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.245 According to one view, there
are three degrees of self-defense: (1) self-defense against a hostile or
aggressive act;24 6 (2) a defensive action against an expected
imminent attack;247 and (3) self-defense against a persistent threat.248
The last two ways are provided by a restrictive interpretation of the
Order, so as to include the least possible number of situations, and
the possibility of amendment or modification of the Order as already
explained above.249  Accordingly, even if the three previous
loopholes had not existed, it would still be possible to circumvent the
Order either by the President or Congress amending or modifying the
Order.
250
Prior to morally and legally dismissing an attempt to thwart acts
of terrorism by killing terrorists, it should be remembered that such
measures can and do save many lives.25'
243. See Johnson III, supra note 220, at 403.
244. See id. at 419.
245. See id. at 419-20.
246. See id. at 420.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 417, 423-27.
250. See id. at 417, 419-20, 426. Apparently, President Bush recently
instructed the CIA to do "everything necessary" in order to capture bin Laden.
See Bob Woodward, CIA Told to Do 'Whatever Necessary' to Kill Bin Laden,
Agency and Military Collaborating at 'Unprecedented' Level, Cheney Says
War Against Terror May Never End, WASH. PosT, Oct. 21, 2001, at Al. Some
see this instruction as a modification of the Order prohibiting harm to foreign
leaders. See id. In my opinion, even prior to this instruction it was possible to
interpret the Order as being inapplicable to the head of a terrorist organization.
251. See Johnson III, supra note 220, at 401.
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XJI.THE POWER OF MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST TERRORISM
A. Demolition of Houses
In the fight against terror, a question often arises regarding the
measures a democratic state may legitimately apply in order to
effectively protect its citizens while maintaining human rights,
including those of the terrorist himself.
2 2
This difficult dilemma brings to the forefront the clash between
"the vital need to preserve the very existence of the State and the
lives of its citizens, and the preservation of its character as a country
governed by law which maintains basic moral values."
253
One measure was established back in the period when the
British governed Palestine by virtue of their Mandate. At that time,
the Emergency Defense Regulations 1945 (Temporary Provisions)
were enacted. 4 Upon the establishment of the State in 1948, Israeli
law adopted these Regulations.25 5 During the British Mandate, the
Defense Regulations applied to all the territories of "Palestine,"
including the West Bank and Gaza Strip.256 Following the departure
of the British and the seizure of these territories by the Jordanians
and Egyptians, the Defense Regulations continued to remain in effect
and became part of the local law.257 Thus, in 1967, when the I.D.F.
captured these areas, the Regulations were already part of local law.
The military commander decided in accordance with the rules of
252. See H.C. 794/98, Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid and Mustapha Dib Merai
Dirani v. Minister of Defence, Batya Arad (unpublished, on file with author);
see also Kadish, supra note 90, at 345 (asking whether it is ever morally
acceptable to use cruel measures in a democracy).
253. The Commission of Inquiry into the Modes of Interrogation of the
General Security Service in the Matter of Hostile Activities, in 1 TRIBUTE TO
LANDAU, at 326 (1995).
254. See 1442 Palestine Gazette, Supp. No. 2, at 1055, 1089 (Sept. 27, 1945)
as amended by 1600 Palestine Gazette Extraordinary, Supp. No. 2, at 1159
(July 31, 1947).
255. See H.C. 2977/91, Muhammed Abed A1-Qadr Salam v. Commander of
I.D.F. Forces, 46(5) P.D. 467.
256. See Cheryl V. Reicin, Preventive Detention, Curfews, Demolition of
Houses and Deportations: An Analysis of Measures Employed by Israel in the
Administered Territories, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 515, 546-48 (1987).
257. See id.
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international law and as part of the effective control of the area,258 to
leave all local law in place to the extent that they did not pose an
obstacle to security needs.
259
Regulation 119(1) of the Defence Emergency Regulations 1945
provides as follows:
A military commander may by order direct the forfeiture to
the Government of Palestine of any house, structure or land
form in which he has reason to suspect that any firearm has
been illegally discharged, or any bomb, grenade or
explosive or incendiary article illegally thrown detonated,
exploded or otherwise discharged or of any house, structure
or land situated in any area, town, village, quarter or street
the inhabitants or some of the inhabitants of which he is
satisfied have committed, or attempted to commit, or
abetted the commission of, or been accessories after the fact
to the commission of, any offense against these Regulations
involving violence or intimidation or any Military Court
offense, and when any house, structure or land is forfeited
as aforesaid, the Military commander may destroy the
house or the structure or anything in or on the house, the
structure or the land.
26 °
There is no doubt that "the power of the military commander under
Regulation 119 is broader than broad, and in the words of counsel for
the Petitioners, the commander has the power to order the destruction
of a complete road or neighborhood."3
261
What is the purpose of this regulation? It seems that the
legislature wished to enable the military commander to respond in an
effective and suitable manner to every act which impairs the security
of the population or threatens public order. The military commander
has broad power to order the confiscation of land and thereafter the
demolition of the structure or structures of which the terrorist made
258. See H.C. 660/88, Assoc. "Inesh el-Ussra" v. Commander of I.D.F.
Forces, 43(3) P.D. 673, 677.
259. Justice Shamgar summarized this matter in H.C. 69/8 1, Basil Abu Ita v.
Commander of Judea and Samaria, 37(2) P.D. 197, 206.
260. 1442 Palestine Gazette, Supp. No. 2, at 1055, 1089 (Sept. 27, 1945) as
amended by 1600 Palestine Gazette Extraordinary, Supp. No. 2, at 1159 (July
31, 1947).
261. H.C. 4772/91, lyad Diab Achmed Hizran v. Commander of I.D.F.
Forces, 46(2) P.D. 150, 154.
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use in the commission of the offense. Moreover, the military
commander may make these orders even if the act of terror was not
committed from the relevant land.262 It is sufficient that the structure
served as the home of the terrorist.
With regard to questions concerning the legality of Regulation
119, it has already been noted that the regulation was adopted into
domestic law by virtue of being part of the prevailing law during the
period of the British Mandate. 2 63 Notwithstanding that in general
these regulations have been sharply criticized by human rights
organizations, 264 the latter have not succeeded in repealing them.
The late Minister of Justice Shmuel Tamir did, however, manage to
divest much of the power to deport a person-at least in relation to
the territory of the State of Israel.265 He also succeeded in replacing
the provisions relating to administrative arrest with a new law that is
more liberal and provides a better balance between human rights and
security needs.
266
The Court has instructed the military commander to conform the
exercise of his power to the severity of the case and the gravity of the
circumstances.267 Consideration must be given not only to the gravity
of the acts of which the terrorist is suspected, but also to the degree
of participation of the rest of the household in advancing these acts.
Also taken into account is the degree of influence which the
demolition of the home will have on the other inhabitants thereof.
2 68
According to administrative law, the test of proportionality is
one of the cornerstones in the examination of the reasonableness of
the decision of the military commander. To illuminate, when it is
possible to achieve a deterrent effect by something less than
demolishing the entire house, this must be done. Likewise, where it
262. See Reicin, supra note 256, at 546-48.
263. See text accompanying supra note 256.
264. For a comprehensive survey of this matter, see A. RUBINSTEIN, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 281-83 (4th ed. 1991).
265. See id.
266. Emergency Powers Detention Law, 1979, S.H. 76; see also Gross,
Hwnan Rights, supra note 185, at 754-57.
267. See Emergency Powers Detention Law, 1979, S.H. 76.
268. See H.C. 6026/94, Abed Al Rahim Hassan Nazal v. Commander of
I.D.F. Forces, 48(5) P.D. 338, 342.
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is possible to achieve the deterrence by sealing the house, this must
suffice.
269
The second domestic test is an examination of the manner in
which the military commander exercised his discretion under the
principles of administrative law. The test is therefore the
reasonableness of the decision.2 7 0 It must, however, be remembered
that in assessing the legality of the decision, the Supreme Court,
sitting as the High Court of Justice, is not a forum before which the
decisions of military commanders may be appealed.271 The relevant
question is not what the Court would have decided in the military
commander's place but rather whether another reasonable military
commander could have adopted a decision that was similar to the one
actually adopted. Only a severe deviation from the scope of
reasonableness will justify judicial intervention.
The courts in Israel have ruled that the military commander's
authority is an administrative one, intended as a tool with which the
commander can respond to terrorist acts, i.e., not only by
preventative measures but also with measures directed at
deterrence.273 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the
deterrent element accompanying the military commander's authority:
"In our rulings we have repeatedly emphasized that the issue is one
of a deterrent sanction only, directed against those who could have,
had they so chosen, prevented the asset being used for illegitimate
purposes, and that this sanction also serves as a deterrent for the
public at large.,
2 74
The difficulty with this approach is that it confers upon a
governmental authority, such as the military commander, power that
in a democratic regime, primafacie, characteristically belongs to the
judiciary. In other words, one of the basic human rights is not to be
punished without due process.
275
269. See Reicin, supra note 256, at 546.
270. See id. at 548-53.
271. See id. at 551.
272. See id. at 549.
273. See id. at 547.
274. H.C. 2977/91, Muhammed Abed A1-Qadr Salam v. Commander of IDF
Forces, 46(5) P.D. 467, 471.
275. For a review of the meaning of this term, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 147-49 (1968); NoRMAN REDLICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 161, 167-73 (1995).
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On the other hand, the possible response is that even a
democratic state, finding itself in a state of war with terrorist
organizations in territories over which it exercises military control,
must equip its commanders with effective tools that can provide an
immediate response to terrorist acts. The measures in this context
are not limited to sophisticated weaponry, but also extend to legal
tools that can provide immediate deterrence of potential terrorists.
276
For many years, the Supreme Court not only saw no defect in
this power conferred upon the military commander, but quite the
opposite, deemed it reasonable and just in view of the legislative
intent to provide the commanders with effective legal tools in their
war against terror.
277
We all are aware and sense the extreme increase of late in
the readiness of terrorist organizations to commit
murderous attacks against all Israelis, soldiers and citizens
alike, with the perpetrators undertaking to execute the
attack by becoming suicide bombers. This is an entirely
new dimension of crazy fanaticism. Given the necessity of
dealing with this phenomenon, the competent authorities
are entitled, inter alia, to adopt the measures of seizure and
demolition of the home of the suicide bomber.... On the
other hand, adoption of such a policy in cases of suicide
terrorists will at the very least leave a vacuum in respect of
the deterrent measures open to the military commander.
Furthermore, it may even preclude any chance that those
living together with the terrorist, and who are aware of his
intention to commit a suicide bombing, will attempt to
prevent him.
278
One of the important balances that the Court struck between the
military interest in prompt deterrence and the inhabitants' rights to
protect their property was the Supreme Court ruling that a person
276. See generally JULIUS STONE, No PEACE - NO WAR IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 15 (1969) (discussing Israel's policy of demolishing buildings implicated
in terrorism); Reicin, supra note 256, at 544. But see, Dan Simon, The
Demolition of Homes in Israeli Occupied Territories, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 60
(1994) (arguing that deterrence does not justify the demolition policy).
277. See Simon, supra note 276, at 37.
278. H.C. 6026/94, Abed el Rachim Chasan Nazal v. Commander of I.D.F.
Forces, 48(5) P.D. 338, 343.
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who saw himself as being harmed by the military commander's
decision was entitled to petition the Supreme Court in order to
contest the legality of the decision, and until that time, the property
could not be harmed.279 In fact, the Court preferred the right to a
hearing, which is a basic right, over the interest of the immediate and
efficient execution of the commander's order. 280
B. Curfews
An additional measure available to a military commander to
prevent terrorist activities or breach of the peace is the curfew.
281
The source of the authority to impose a curfew is also found in the
Defense Regulations, Regulation 124 of which provides as follows:
A military commander may by order require every person
within any area specified in the order, to remain within
doors between such hours as may be specified in the order,
and in such case, if any person is or remains out of doors
within that area between such hours without a permit in
writing, issued by or on behalf of the military commander
or some person duly authorized by the military commander
to issue such permits, he shall be guilty of an offense
against the Regulations.
282
Even though Regulation 124 does not restrict the military
commander's discretion, and allows him to decide when to impose a
curfew, it is clear that his discretion is not unlimited and must
comply with the criteria established by constitutional and
administrative law for the exercise of governmental authority.283 For
example, the military commander must be convinced that the
imposition of the curfew is essential for the promotion of one of the
goals with which he is charged, i.e. the security of the area or public
order. However, it is not sufficient that he regards the curfew as
necessary for that goal. He must also be convinced that there is no
279. See Reicin, supra note 256, at 546-53.
280. See A. RUBINSTEIN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 115-16 (4th ed. 1991).
281. See Rejoin, supra note 256, at 543-46.
282. 1442 Palestine Gazette, Supp. No. 2, at 1055, 1089 (Sept. 27, 1945) as
amended by 1600 Palestine Gazette Extraordinary, Supp. No. 2, at 1159 (July
31, 1947).
283. See Reiein, supra note 256, at 543-45.
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other, less harsh way of achieving that goal. In other words, the
commander must comply with the reasonableness requirement.284
The curfew is intended to assist the security forces to restore
order when order is disturbed due to illegal demonstrations, serious
riots or similar behavior.285 In order to allow the restoration of peace
and quiet, a brief curfew is understandable. The same is true in the
case of a terrorist act when the commander knows that the terrorists
have taken refuge in one of the houses. Imposing a curfew would be
an understandable measure to facilitate the location and capture of
the terrorists.286
A possible claim against this measure is that it harms entirely
innocent people unconnected to the disturbances or the terrorist act.
Even so, it must be clear that the curfew must not be imposed as a
punishment for conduct that disturbs public order or security of the
area. The authority was not intended for that purpose and if the
military commander acts in that fashion his acts will be
invalidated.287
The curfew is a drastic measure which severely violates human
rights, but we must not forget that if used intelligently it will allow
the residents to live their lives in a reasonable manner, even during
times of war and emergency. It must be a last resort, when no less
severe alternative measure is available and it must be proportional. It
is forbidden to impose it for an extended period and the military
commander must reassess its necessity from time to time.288
Furthermore, if the curfew continues for more than a few hours,
the military commander must occasionally lift it for a short time in
order to allow people to leave their homes to replenish urgent food
supplies which they need at home. The military commander must
also ensure the ongoing functioning of medical services during a
284. See H.C. 1759/94, An Srozberg v. Minister of Def. (unpublished, on file
with author).
285. See Reicin, supra note 256, at 544.
286. See id. at 544-545.
287. This was Judge Zamir's point in H.C. 1759/94, An Srozberg v. Minister
of Def. (unpublished, on file with author).
288. See H.C. 1113/90, Said Shaav v. I.D.F. Commander Gaza Strip,
Southern Command, 44(4) P.D. 590.
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curfew and enable sick people requiring treatment and medical
personnel to move freely.
289
As with any other military powers that the commander has, the
curfew is also subject to judicial review of the Supreme Court, sitting
as the High Court of Justice.290 The problem is that this mode of
supervision is not always efficient, for if the curfew is only of short
duration, practically speaking, there is no time for the resident under
curfew to petition the High Court.2 9  It would be more efficient to
establish a speedier process of review, for example an appeal to a
military court that supervises the actions of the commanders.
292
C. Imposition of a Blockade or Encirclement
The military commander has an additional power, namely, to
impose a blockade or an encirclement of a certain place.2 93 This
authority derives from a number of sources. Thus, for example,
Regulations 122 and 126 authorize the commander to limit
movement in certain areas or streets; Regulation 125 allows the
declaration of a certain area as a closed area, entry to and exit from
which is by permit alone.
294
Another normative source is the security legislation in the
territories. This is legislation promulgated by a military commander,
by virtue of his powers under international law as the controlling
force in the area.
29 5
289. See H.C. 477/91, The Israeli-Palestinian Doctors Soc'y v. Minister of
Def., 45(2) P.D. 832, 836.
290. See H.C. 1759/94, An Srozberg v. Minister of Def. (unpublished, on file
with author).
291. Even though, the Supreme Court stressed the need to allow residents
under a curfew to come before the Court and state their objections to the
legality of the curfew. See H.C. 1358/91, Nihaad Arshid v. Minister of the
Police, 45(2) P.D. 747.
292. See Reicin, supra note 256, at 545.
293. See Palestine Gazette, Supp. No. 2, at 1055, 1089 (Sept. 27, 1945) as
amended by 1600 Palestine Gazette Extraordinary, Supp. No. 2, at 1159 (July
31, 1947).
294. See id.
295. See The Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, Respecting the Law and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 43.
The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-
establish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
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In fact, the regulations allow restriction upon the freedom of
movement in a graduated and geographical manner, beginning with
restrictions of entry or exit to all areas of the West Bank or the Gaza
Strip, with the exception of those people who received special
296 sc ae emipermits. In such a case, the accepted term is a "closure" which is
imposed upon territories in order to prevent the transit of persons
into the area of the State of Israel.297 These closures are usually
imposed when intelligence warnings are received regarding the
impending entry of terrorists into Israel in order to commit terrorist
acts. The restriction of passage between the territories and Israel is
not just a restriction of movement for the residents of these areas but,
more importantly, it prevents many of them from earning a living in
Israel. a98 This is one of the most serious problems facing the State of
Israel. Should this be regarded as a form of collective punishment?
The answer is in the negative. The reason for imposing the closure is
not punitive but exclusively to prevent continued acts of terrorism by
blocking the terrorists' passage into Israel.299  The result indeed
harms others, but this cannot be avoided. Further, even if an
inhabitant of the territories previously had a work permit allowing
him to enter Israel, none of the residents have any reason to suppose
that the permit is inviolable. The permit is issued subject to military
necessities.
The Minister of the Interior is entitled, for humanitarian reasons,
to permit the entry of people into Israel and provide them with
temporary residence permits.30 0  The same applies to the military
commander. Given the economic difficulties of the Palestinian
residents, when circumstances permit and the danger of terrorists
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country.
Id.
296. See Palestine Gazette, Supp. No. 2, at 1055, 1089 (Sept. 27, 1945) as
amended by 1600 Palestine Gazette Extraordinary, Supp. No. 2, at 1159 (July
31, 1947).
297. See H.C. 1759/94, An Srozberg v. Minister of Def. (unpublished, on file
with author).
298. See id.
299. See id. (citing security considerations for the closure).
300. See id.
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coming into Israel decreases, he can sometimes allow a specific
number of residents to come to work in Israel.3 °'
The Supreme Court assesses the imposition of the closure in
accordance with the same criteria that it established in the past for
assessing the military commander's discretion:
This is the response to the petition to the extent that it
relates on a general level to the imposition of a curfew
"from time to time" or to the imposition of other forms of
restriction on "freedom of movement, occupation and
work" of the local population. In all cases of the imposition
of such restrictions, the competent authority must assess the
degree of security needs for exercising the power given to it
as compared to the harm caused to the local population, it
must avoid imposition of restrictions as punitive measures
and must refrain from the adoption of harsh measures
which cause more harm than is required under the
circumstances. This is a criterion for assessing a decision
for imposing any particular restriction at any particular time
or place. The general answer is therefore that the law
permits the military commander of the territories to impose
a curfew and additional restrictions, as established by law,
and to the extent necessitated by security considerations in
every case.
30 2
D. Declaring a Place to Be a Closed Military Area
Regulation 125 of the Defense Regulations places an additional
power at the disposal of the military commander. The Regulation
empowers the military commander to declare a certain place or
location to be a closed military area.30 3 The meaning of such a
declaration is that, for the duration of its validity, both the entrance
and departure from the area require a special permit. The Regulation
provides as follows:
A military commander may by order declare any area or
place to be a closed area for the purpose of these
301. See id.
302. Id.
303. See Palestine Gazette, Supp. No. 2, at 1055, 1089 (Sept. 27, 1945) as
amended by 1600 Palestine Gazette Extraordinary, Supp. No. 2, at 1159 (July
31, 1947).
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Regulations. Any person who during any period in which
any such order is in force, in relation to any area of place,
enters or leaves that area or place without a permit in
writing issued by, or on behalf of the military commander
shall be guilty of an offense against these Regulations.
304
When the I.D.F. entered the territories of the West Bank in 1967
it declared it to be a closed area, both in accordance with the Defense
Regulations which were valid at that time and also in accordance
with a special directive issued by the I.D.F.3 °5 The meaning of this
declaration was that both entry into and departure from the West
Bank territories required a special permit from the military
commander. A result of the declaration was that people who had left
the area prior to the Six-Day War could not return without receiving
a special permit from the military commander. 30 6 Likewise, those
who left temporarily but failed to come back in time required permits
which were not always granted.30 7
Even though Regulation 125 does not specify the conditions for
exercising the power, it is clear that it is subject to the rules of proper
administration, as are all other powers of the military commander.
The discretion of the military commander must be reasonable. It
must take into account the human rights of all those affected. The
exercise of the power must be for a proper purpose, of an appropriate
degree and obviously, must be in good faith and the product of
relevant considerations.
30 8
XIII. CONCLUSION
Israel today is subject to terrorist attacks that are incomparable
in scope. The recent terrorist attacks launched on the United States
were wide ranging, destructive and costly in terms of human lives.
304. Id.
305. See H.C. 629/82, Vagia Salah Muchmad Mustapha v. The Military
Commander, 37(1) P.D. 158, 161.
306. See Arab Human Rights Organizations, EQUAL RIGHTS AND MINORITY
RIGHTS FOR THE PALESTINIAN ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL: A REPORT TO THE
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE ON ISRAEL'S IMPLEMENTATION OF
ARTICLES 26 & 27 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS (1998), at http://www.arabha.org/core/iccpr98.doc.
307. See H.C. 802/79, Rafik Chalil Chmadan Abdallah v. Commander of
Judea Area, 34(4) P.D. 1.
308. See id. at 2-3.
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As a result of these attacks many are afraid to walk the streets of
New York. People fear to open letters in case they encounter the
lethal anthrax virus. Throughout the United States people are
reluctant to travel because they fear another terrorist attack. In Israel
people long ago abandoned their daily routines, some feeling the
urge to confine themselves to their homes. Today it is impossible to
know from which place the next attack will come, but it is clear that
it will come. No day passes without shooting, rocket attacks, road
side bombs or suicide bombers. 30 9  On occasion the attack
"succeeds," leaving behind dozens of dead and injured. On occasion
it "fails," "merely" causing minor injuries or damage to property.
The problem of terrorism is world wide. It is not confined to
Israel. The United States recently joined the community of states
subject to terrorism, with the massive strike against the Twin Towers
of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Democratic
countries have a difficult problem defending themselves against
guerilla and terrorist organizations. On one hand they are committed
to defending the peace and security of their citizens and on the other
they are obliged to act exclusively on the basis of their prevailing
laws and regulations. Thus, democracies must fight terrorism with
all the means at their disposal, save for those means which domestic
law or international law prohibit. This Article described a number of
legal measures used by Israel and in some cases compared them to
measures implemented by other democratic countries.
We all hope that the terrorist acts will cease and that the war
currently being waged by the United States against terrorism will
achieve success in the field. However, until this vision is realized,
Israel has no choice but to defend itself against terrorist
organizations, by every means possible, subject to law, whereas the
terrorist organizations for their part breach every law and rule
imaginable. The "war" between terrorist organizations and
democratic countries has never been fair. Whereas terrorist
organizations do as they please, without consideration for even the
most basic of principles-such as not to injure children, never mind
other innocent members of the population-democratic countries
must defend themselves with one hand tied behind their backs. I
309. See Howard Gleckman, Don't Just Read His Lips, BUS. WK. ONLINE,
Sept. 25, 2001, at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/
sep2001/nf2001925_8875.htm.
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have chosen to end this article by quoting the following passage
which elucidates the delicate balance that a democracy must draw
between its desire to defend itself and the need to act within the
boundaries of prevailing law:
Every government official must respect the law. This duty
applies in times of calm and is also pertinent in times of
emergency. "When the canons shoot, the muses are quiet."
However, even when the canon shoot, it is necessary to
preserve the rule of law. Society's fortitude in confronting
its enemies is based on its recognition that it is fighting for
values worth defending. The rule of law is a component of
national security. The security services are creations of the
law. They must respect the law. Security considerations
may on occasion influence determinations relating to the
content of the law. However, when this content is
determined, the (formal) rule of law requires compliance
with the law, without security considerations becoming
justification for its breach.31 °
310. Aharon Barak, The Rule of Law and the Supremacy of the Constitution,
5(2) LAW & GOV'T 375, 381 (2000) (quoting H.C. 168/91, Markus v. Minister
of Defense and Others, 45(1) P.D. 467, 470).
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